A one way hashing function can only be use for the integrity of a message and not for authentication or confidentiality. Because the hash creates just a fingerprint of the message which cannot be reversed and it is also very difficult to create a second message with the same hash.
A hash by itself does not provide Authentication. It only provides a weak form or integrity. It would be possible for an attacker to perform a Man-In-The-Middle attack where both the hash and the digest could be changed without the receiver knowing it.
A hash combined with your session key will produce a Message Authentication Code (MAC) which will provide you with both authentication of the source and integrity. It is sometimes referred to as a Keyed Hash. A hash encrypted with the sender private key produce a Digital Signature which provide authentication, but not the hash by itself. Hashing functions by themselves such as MD5, SHA1, SHA2, SHA-3 does not provide authentication.
Source: HARRIS, Shon, All-In-One CISSP Certification Exam Guide, McGraw-Hill/Osborne, 2001, Page 548

A chosen-ciphertext attack is one in which cryptanalyst may choose a piece of ciphertext and attempt to obtain the corresponding decrypted plaintext. This type of attack is generally most applicable to public-key cryptosystems.
A chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) is an attack model for cryptanalysis in which the cryptanalyst gathers information, at least in part, by choosing a ciphertext and obtaining its decryption under an unknown key. In the attack, an adversary has a chance to enter one or more known ciphertexts into the system and obtain the resulting plaintexts. From these pieces of information the adversary can attempt to recover the hidden secret key used for decryption.
A number of otherwise secure schemes can be defeated under chosen-ciphertext attack. For example, the El Gamal cryptosystem is semantically secure under chosen-plaintext attack, but this semantic security can be trivially defeated under a chosen-ciphertext attack. Early versions of RSA padding used in the SSL protocol were vulnerable to a sophisticated adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack which revealed SSL session keys. Chosen-ciphertext attacks have implications for some self-synchronizing stream ciphers as well. Designers of tamper-resistant cryptographic smart cards must be particularly cognizant of these attacks, as these devices may be completely under the control of an adversary, who can issue a large number of chosen-ciphertexts in an attempt to recover the hidden secret key.
According to RSA: Cryptanalytic attacks are generally classified into six categories that distinguish the kind of information the cryptanalyst has available to mount an attack. The categories of attack are listed here roughly in increasing order of the quality of information available to the cryptanalyst, or, equivalently, in decreasing order of the level of difficulty to the cryptanalyst. The objective of the cryptanalyst in all cases is to be able to decrypt new pieces of ciphertext without additional information. The ideal for a cryptanalyst is to extract the secret key.
A ciphertext-only attack is one in which the cryptanalyst obtains a sample of ciphertext, without the plaintext associated with it. This data is relatively easy to obtain in many scenarios, but a successful ciphertext-only attack is generally difficult, and requires a very large ciphertext sample. Such attack was possible on cipher using Code Book Mode where frequency analysis was being used and even thou only the ciphertext was available, it was still possible to eventually collect enough data and decipher it without having the key.
A known-plaintext attack is one in which the cryptanalyst obtains a sample of ciphertext and the corresponding plaintext as well. The known-plaintext attack (KPA) or crib is an attack model for cryptanalysis where the attacker has samples of both the plaintext and its encrypted version (ciphertext), and is at liberty to make use of them to reveal further secret information such as secret keys and code books.
A chosen-plaintext attack is one in which the cryptanalyst is able to choose a quantity of plaintext and then obtain the corresponding encrypted ciphertext. A chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) is an attack model for cryptanalysis which presumes that the attacker has the capability to choose arbitrary plaintexts to be encrypted and obtain the corresponding ciphertexts. The goal of the attack is to gain some further information which reduces the security of the encryption scheme. In the worst case, a chosen-plaintext attack could reveal the scheme’s secret key.
This appears, at first glance, to be an unrealistic model; it would certainly be unlikely that an attacker could persuade a human cryptographer to encrypt large amounts of plaintexts of the attacker’s choosing. Modern cryptography, on the other hand, is implemented in software or hardware and is used for a diverse range of applications; for many cases, a chosen-plaintext attack is often very feasible. Chosen-plaintext attacks become extremely important in the context of public key cryptography, where the encryption key is public and attackers can encrypt any plaintext they choose.
Any cipher that can prevent chosen-plaintext attacks is then also guaranteed to be secure against known-plaintext and ciphertext-only attacks; this is a conservative approach to security.
Two forms of chosen-plaintext attack can be distinguished:
Batch chosen-plaintext attack, where the cryptanalyst chooses all plaintexts before any of them are encrypted. This is often the meaning of an unqualified use of “chosen-plaintext attack”.
Adaptive chosen-plaintext attack, is a special case of chosen-plaintext attack in which the cryptanalyst is able to choose plaintext samples dynamically, and alter his or her choices based on the results of previous encryptions. The cryptanalyst makes a series of interactive queries, choosing subsequent plaintexts based on the information from the previous encryptions.
Non-randomized (deterministic) public key encryption algorithms are vulnerable to simple “dictionary”-type attacks, where the attacker builds a table of likely messages and their corresponding ciphertexts. To find the decryption of some observed ciphertext, the attacker simply looks the ciphertext up in the table. As a result, public-key definitions of security under chosen-plaintext attack require probabilistic encryption (i.e., randomized encryption). Conventional symmetric ciphers, in which the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt a text, may also be vulnerable to other forms of chosen-plaintext attack, for example, differential cryptanalysis of block ciphers.
An adaptive-chosen-ciphertext is the adaptive version of the above attack. A cryptanalyst can mount an attack of this type in a scenario in which he has free use of a piece of decryption hardware, but is unable to extract the decryption key from it.
An adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (abbreviated as CCA2) is an interactive form of chosen-ciphertext attack in which an attacker sends a number of ciphertexts to be decrypted, then uses the results of these decryptions to select subsequent ciphertexts. It is to be distinguished from an indifferent chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA1).
The goal of this attack is to gradually reveal information about an encrypted message, or about the decryption key itself. For public-key systems, adaptive-chosen-ciphertexts are generally applicable only when they have the property of ciphertext malleability — that is, a ciphertext can be modified in specific ways that will have a predictable effect on the decryption of that message.
A Plaintext Only Attack is simply a bogus detractor. If you have the plaintext only then there is no need to perform any attack.
References: RSA Laboratories FAQs about today’s cryptography: What are some of the basic types of cryptanalytic attack?
also see: http://www.giac.org/resources/whitepaper/cryptography/57.php and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chosen-plaintext_attack

The answer above is the correct answer because it is FALSE. Rijndael does not support multiples of 64 bits but multiples of 32 bits in the range of 128 bits to 256 bits. Key length could be 128, 160, 192, 224, and 256.
Both block length and key length can be extended very easily to multiples of 32 bits. For a total combination of 25 different block and key size that are possible.
The Rijndael Cipher Rijndael is a block cipher, designed by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen as a candidate algorithm for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the United States of America. The cipher has a variable block length and key length.
Rijndael can be implemented very efficiently on a wide range of processors and in hardware.
The design of Rijndael was strongly influenced by the design of the block cipher Square.
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) keys are defined to be either 128, 192, or 256 bits in accordance with the requirements of the AES.
The number of rounds, or iterations of the main algorithm, can vary from 10 to 14 within the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and is dependent on the block size and key length. 128 bits keys uses 10 rounds or encryptions, 192 bits keys uses 12 rounds of encryption, and 256 bits keys uses 14 rounds of encryption.
The low number of rounds has been one of the main criticisms of Rijndael, but if this ever becomes a problem the number of rounds can easily be increased at little extra cost performance wise by increasing the block size and key length.
Range of key and block lengths in Rijndael and AES Rijndael and AES differ only in the range of supported values for the block length and cipher key length.
For Rijndael, the block length and the key length can be independently specified to any multiple of 32 bits, with a minimum of 128 bits, and a maximum of 256 bits. The support for block and key lengths 160 and 224 bits was introduced in Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, AES submission document on Rijndael, Version 2, September 1999 available at http://csrc.nist.gov/ archive/aes/rijndael/Rijndael-ammended.pdf
AES fixes the block length to 128 bits, and supports key lengths of 128, 192 or 256 bits only.
Reference used for this question: The Rijndael Page and http://csrc.nist.gov/archive/aes/rijndael/Rijndael-ammended.pdf and FIPS PUB 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, November 2001.

The computations involved in selecting keys and in enciphering data are complex, and are not practical for manual use. However, using mathematical properties of modular arithmetic and a method known as computing in Galois fields, RSA is quite feasible for computer use. Source: FITES, Philip E., KRATZ, Martin P., Information Systems Security: A Practitioner’s Reference, 1993, Van Nostrand Reinhold, page 44.

Source: TIPTON, Hal, (ISC)2, Introduction to the CISSP Exam presentation.

Source: TIPTON, Hal, (ISC)2, Introduction to the CISSP Exam presentation.

An algorithm that turns messages or text into a fixed string of digits, usually for security or data management purposes. The “one way” means that it’s nearly impossible to derive the original text from the string.
A one-way hash function is used to create digital signatures, which in turn identify and authenticate the sender and message of a digitally distributed message.
A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic procedure that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bit string, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that an accidental or intentional change to the data will change the hash value. The data to be encoded is often called the “message,” and the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or simply digest.
The ideal cryptographic hash function has four main or significant properties:
it is easy (but not necessarily quick) to compute the hash value for any given message
it is infeasible to generate a message that has a given hash
it is infeasible to modify a message without changing the hash
it is infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash
Cryptographic hash functions have many information security applications, notably in digital signatures, message authentication codes (MACs), and other forms of authentication. They can also be used as ordinary hash functions, to index data in hash tables, for fingerprinting, to detect duplicate data or uniquely identify files, and as checksums to detect accidental data corruption. Indeed, in information security contexts, cryptographic hash values are sometimes called (digital) fingerprints, checksums, or just hash values, even though all these terms stand for functions with rather different properties and purposes.
Source:
TIPTON, Hal, (ISC)2, Introduction to the CISSP Exam presentation. and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function

RFC2828 (Internet Security Glossary) defines a known-plaintext attack as a cryptanalysis technique in which the analyst tries to determine the key from knowledge of some plaintext-ciphertext pairs (although the analyst may also have other clues, such as the knowing the cryptographic algorithm). A chosen-ciphertext attack is defined as a cryptanalysis technique in which the analyst tries to determine the key from knowledge of plaintext that corresponds to ciphertext selected (i.e., dictated) by the analyst. A chosen-plaintext attack is a cryptanalysis technique in which the analyst tries to determine the key from knowledge of ciphertext that corresponds to plaintext selected (i.e., dictated) by the analyst. The other choice is a distracter.
The following are incorrect answers:
A chosen-plaintext attacks The attacker has the plaintext and ciphertext, but can choose the plaintext that gets encrypted to see the corresponding ciphertext. This gives her more power and possibly a deeper understanding of the way the encryption process works so she can gather more information about the key being used. Once the key is discovered, other messages encrypted with that key can be decrypted.
A chosen-ciphertext attack In chosen-ciphertext attacks, the attacker can choose the ciphertext to be decrypted and has access to the resulting decrypted plaintext. Again, the goal is to figure out the key. This is a harder attack to carry out compared to the previously mentioned attacks, and the attacker may need to have control of the system that contains the cryptosystem.
A known-algorithm attack Knowing the algorithm does not give you much advantage without knowing the key. This is a bogus detractor. The algorithm should be public, which is the Kerckhoffs’s Principle . The only secret should be the key.
Reference(s) used for this question:
Source: SHIREY, Robert W., RFC2828: Internet Security Glossary, may 2000. and Harris, Shon (2012-10-25). CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide, 6th Edition (p. 866). McGraw-Hill. Kindle Edition. and Kerckhoffs’s Principle

RFC 2828 (Internet Security Glossary) defines Simple Key Management for Internet Protocols (SKIP) as:
A key distribution protocol that uses hybrid encryption to convey session keys that are used to encrypt data in IP packets.
SKIP is an hybrid Key distribution protocol similar to SSL, except that it establishes a long-term key once, and then requires no prior communication in order to establish or exchange keys on a session-by-session basis. Therefore, no connection setup overhead exists and new keys values are not continually generated. SKIP uses the knowledge of its own secret key or private component and the destination’s public component to calculate a unique key that can only be used between them.
IKE stand for Internet Key Exchange, it makes use of ISAKMP and OAKLEY internally. Internet Key Exchange (IKE or IKEv2) is the protocol used to set up a security association (SA) in the IPsec protocol suite. IKE builds upon the Oakley protocol and ISAKMP. IKE uses X.509 certificates for authentication and a Diffie–Hellman key exchange to set up a shared session secret from which cryptographic keys are derived.
The following are incorrect answers:
ISAKMP is an Internet IPsec protocol to negotiate, establish, modify, and delete security associations, and to exchange key generation and authentication data, independent of the details of any specific key generation technique, key establishment protocol, encryption algorithm, or authentication mechanism. IKE is an Internet, IPsec, key-establishment protocol (partly based on OAKLEY) that is intended for putting in place authenticated keying material for use with ISAKMP and for other security associations, such as in AH and ESP.
IPsec Key exchange (IKE) is only a detracto.
Reference(s) used for this question: SHIREY, Robert W., RFC2828: Internet Security Glossary, may 2000. and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Key-Management_for_Internet_Pro… and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Key-Management_for_Internet_Pro…

RFC 2828 (Internet Security Glossary) defines IKE as an Internet, IPsec, key-establishment protocol (partly based on OAKLEY) that is intended for putting in place authenticated keying material for use with ISAKMP and for other security associations, such as in AH and ESP.
The following are incorrect answers:
SKIP is a key distribution protocol that uses hybrid encryption to convey session keys that are used to encrypt data in IP packets.
The Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) is defined as a key agreement algorithm that is similar to the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, uses 1024-bit asymmetric keys, and was developed and formerly classified at the secret level by the NSA.
Security Association Authentication Protocol (SAAP) is a distracter.
Reference(s) used for this question: SHIREY, Robert W., RFC2828: Internet Security Glossary, may 2000.